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IN DEFENSE OF IDEOLOGY: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO
THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION PROCESS
Lori A. Ringhand*
ABSTRACT
In this paper, Professor Ringhand offers a principled defense of an ideological
approach to the Supreme Court Justice confirmation process. In constructing her
argument, she does three things. First, she explores how the insights provided by re-
cent empirical legal scholarship have created a need to rethink the role of the Supreme
Court and, consequently, the process by which we select Supreme Court Justices. In
doing so, Professor Ringhand explains how these insights have called into question
much of our conventional constitutional narrative, and how this failure of the conven-
tional narrative has in turn undermined traditional objections to an ideologically-based
confirmation process. Second, Professor Ringhand explains how an ideologically-
based approach to the confirmation process is not just unobjectionable, but can in fact
play a normatively desirable role in ongoing efforts to construct alternative constitu-
tional narratives, narratives that attempt to guide orjustify the use ofjudicial review
while also incorporating a realistic understanding of the capacities of the Supreme
Court. She concludes by reviewing the historic use of ideology in the confirmation
process, and discussing several additional benefits that could result from the more
open acknowledgement of the role ideology has-and does-play in that process.
INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate in both academic and political realms about the
appropriate role of senators charged with evaluating prospective Supreme Court
Justices. Should they limit themselves to consideration of a nominee's professional
competence, or should they also consider a nominee's constitutional or political
ideology?' Proponents of an ideologically-based confirmation process argue that
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to
thank Barry Friedman, Mark Graber, Nichole Huberfeld, Dan Lorentz, Joseph Miller, Terri
Peretti, Eric Segall, Neil Siegel, Lawrence Solum, Mark Tushnet, Rebecca Zietlow and the
participants at the 2008 West Coast Public Law Schmooze for comments on earlier drafts of
this piece. Thanks also are owed to James McPhillips and Lori Elizabeth Morris for their
research assistance and to Melissa Connelly for her editorial help. Errors are of course
my own. This article was written before the August 6, 2009 confirmation of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, and any references to the Justices ofthe Court reflect its makeup before that date.
"Ideology" in this context includes considerations that go beyond a nominee's abstract
constitutional or interpretive philosophies to questions intended to predict how a nominee will
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a vigorous examination of the nominee's ideological preferences is necessary to en-
sure judicial accountability.' Opponents argue that such an examination threatens
judicial independence.'
This paper takes a fresh look at the question by considering the confirmation pro-
cess in the larger context of recent developments in constitutional theory. It proceeds
in three parts. Part I tells the story of the Supreme Court.' In doing so, it unpacks
the conventional narrative of the Court and explains the strain put on that narrative
by empirical legal scholarship exploring the way the Court actually functions. It then
explains how the failure of the conventional narrative in turn undermines traditional
objections to the use of ideology in Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Part I
concludes by discussing two evolving constitutional narratives and positing that an
ideological approach to the confirmation process could further the goals asserted by
advocates of each of these approaches. The failure of the conventional narrative, in
vote on certain issues, such as questions about the nominee's position on previously decided
cases, including controversial or unsettled cases. An ideologically-based confirmation process,
in other words, is one in which the Senate (and the President) base their actions at least in
part on their agreement or disagreement with the nominee's perceived ideological positions.
See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 109-11 (2005) (measuring the "ideology" of Supreme Court nominees by
determining whether they held moderate, conservative, or liberal views on particular issues
such as support for criminal defendants, privacy, racial equality, and the First Amendment).
2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 131-37 (1985); Steven
Goldberg, Putting the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No, 17 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 192 (2004); Martin H. Redish, Legal Realism and the Confirmation
Process, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 886, 887-88 (1990).
3 See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 962, 965
(1990); see also Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent andlnfluence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 863
(1990). But see Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation
Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913,966-67 (1983) (considering and
rejecting the argument that choosing a Supreme Court Justice based on ideology threatens
the Court's independence).
' The use in this paper of the terms "narrative" and "story" is intentional. As Jack Balkin
has noted, the value of theories of constitutional interpretation is that they give us as a nation
a shared language through which to argue about constitutional meaning and legitimacy. See
Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 517-19 (2007); see also LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 111-16
(7th ed. 2005) (discussing various methods of constitutional interpretation). Robert Post and
Reva Siegel have made a similar point, eloquently observing in their examination oforiginalism
as a political practice that theories about the Constitution succeed when they provide a com-
pelling language-a story--connecting constitutional law to a living political culture. Robert
Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 (2006); see also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos andNarrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983) (arguing that consti-
tutional interpretation serves as a "connective between states of affairs, both of which can
be represented in their normative significance only through the devices of narrative").
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other words, allows us to see that the use of ideology in the confirmation process is
not just unobjectionable but is instead both normatively desirable and theoretically
useful to evolving constitutional approaches.
Having laid this foundation, Part H of the paper explains in depth how an ideo-
logical approach to confirmations can play this role. In doing so, it reconceptualizes
the confirmation process as a mechanism through which the public can legitimize
constitutional change over time while still preserving the distinction between con-
stitutional and ordinary law. Part II also explains how the evolving constitutional
narratives discussed in Part I can benefit from this reconceptualization.
Part I1 of the paper explains how the approach developed here is neither new nor
radical. This part explores how ideology has, despite our current unwillingness to
acknowledge it, played a role in the confirmation process throughout our history.
The contribution of this paper, therefore, is not to propose radical change but rather
to offer a principled defense of what is-and long has been-our actual practice. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of several additional benefits that could result
from embracing the vision of the confirmation process articulated here.
I. THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Conventional Narrative
The conventional story of the Supreme Court is familiar to all Americans. The
Constitution embodies the commitment we as a nation have made to remove certain
policy choices from the realm of ordinary politics and elevate them to the level of
constitutionally protected rules. The role of the Supreme Court is to use its legal ex-
pertise to ascertain and protect those entrenched rules against the contrary passions
of transient majorities.5 In this story, the Justices are the guardians of the rules we
have embodied in our Constitution and their duty is to bind us to those constitutional
commitments, even-or perhaps especially-when confronted with other govern-
mental actors who want to transgress them.6 Their job is to be countermajoritarian.
To do this job properly, however, the Justices must be protected from the political
pressures and preferences that influence elected officials; they must be independent.
We give them this independence by appointing them rather than electing them,7 and
by giving them life tenure. But that independence comes at a cost. Because the
Justices are unaccountable to the public, and because the Court has the power to over-
ride democratically made choices, there is always a danger of the Court becoming
' See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).
6 Seeid.
7 See U. S. CONST. art II, §2.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2009]
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tyrannical--of it subjugating self-government to "government byjudiciary."9 Thus,
while its countermajoritarian duties require the Court to be independent, that very
independence raises the risk that the Justices will use their power to impose their own
personal preferences in lieu of constitutional law."0
Under the conventional narrative, therefore, judicial discretion must be carefully
constrained. Much constitutional scholarship arising under the conventional narra-
tive thus has focused on fixing constitutional meaning by developing methods of
constitutional interpretation capable of generating determinate answers to constitu-
tional questions." Originalists attempt to find that meaning in the original public
meaning of the written Constitution. 2 Others look for it in the deductive logic of
legal reasoning, 3 or in moral or ethical truths. 4 These approaches to constitutional
interpretation are very different, but each sees the reduction of judicial discretion and
the search for "true" constitutional meaning as essential to the legitimate exercise
of judicial power.
Under this conventional narrative, objections to the use of ideology in the
Supreme Court confirmation process make a certain amount of sense. If the Court
is to fulfill its duty to use objective interpretive methods to find and impose fixed con-
stitutional restrictions on popular government, then the Court must be independent
from political influence. 5 To condition confirnation on a Supreme Court nominee's
agreement with either the President's or the Senate's constitutional preferences would
interfere with that duty by inappropriately imposing majoritarian preferences on a
countermajoritarian body.' 6 It would hinder the ability of the Court to interpret the
9 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 273 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 132 (1960)); see also BICKEL, supra note 5.
'0o See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 80-81 (2001).
" See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1789,
1810 (2005); see also PERETrn, supra note 10, at 35.
12 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13 (2001).
'3 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731
(2009) (discussing the impact legal realism has had on the judiciary).
14 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
'" See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS xi (1994); Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1189-92 (1988) [hereinafter Carter, The Confirmation Mess]. Carter argues that
encouraging the Senate to use "litmus tests" when considering Supreme Court confirmations
would "enshrin[e] the politically expedient judgments of a given era as fundamental consti-
tutional law." Carter, supra note 3, at 965. He calls such a result a "despotic horror." Id; see
also Nagel, supra note 3, at 863 (arguing for a more vigorous senatorial rule but agreeing with
critics of such a rule that such questioning poses a real risk to the Court's independence).
16 See Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 15, at 1190; Carter, supra note 3, at 963.
Grover Rees has made the interesting point that requiring nominees to answer more specific
questions about their constitutional understandings is consistent with both legal realism and
[Vol. 18:131
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Constitution as it, and it alone, sees fit.17 Concerns about judicial independence have,
consequently, moored opposition to the use of ideology in the judicial confirmation
process ever since the legal academy began obsessing about the "countermajoritarian
difficulty" more than forty years ago.'"
The problem with this argument, of course, is that it rests on a vision of the
Supreme Court-the conventional narrative-that is fundamentally inconsistent
with much of what empirical and positive legal scholarship has taught us about
how the Court actually functions. That scholarship, which has been exhaustively
explored elsewhere, has taught us that Supreme Court decisions are rarely counter-
maj oritarian, 9 that those that are rarely last,2° and that even our most rigorous methods
legal formalism: to legal realists, it matters because the Constitution is under-determinate; to
legal formalists it matters because there are correct constitutional answers and we therefore
should reject a Justice who gets the Constitution wrong. See Rees, supra note 3, at 947.
" See Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 15, at 1193-94.
18 See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153, 155-56 (2002).
19 See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CoNsT1TuTIONALiSM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
89 (1996); Friedman, supra note 18, at 210-15 (noting that most of the Warren Court's contro-
versial decisions were not truly countermajoritarian, but rather were made in the face of legis-
lative inaction while supported by national majorities, and discussing the Warren and Burger
Courts' quick reversals of the unpopular criminal rights cases); Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 647-48 & n.365 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman,
Dialogue]; Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596,
2607 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, MediatedPopular Constitutionalism] ("[T]ime-and not
too long a time-usually serves to ensure that the Court bows to public opinion, or confirms
that public opinion was moving in the same direction as the Court's decisions."); Thomas R.
Marshall, Policymaking and the Modem Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?,
42 W. POL. Q. 493,493-504 (1989) (discussing the Court's success in setting public policy);
Keith E. Whittington & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress 1789-2006 2
(Oct. 14,2006) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssm.com/abstract_908986. While
some Supreme Court decisions almost certainly are genuinely countermajoritarian (the flag
burning decisions and much of the Court's current school prayer jurisprudence probably fall
into this group), such cases appear to be rare. Moreover, the finality of these decisions may
itself be a fiction in that some unpopular decisions, such as the school desegregation decisions,
were simply not obeyed in large swaths of the country. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COuRTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 15-16,84-85 (2d ed. 2008).
20 More than fifty years ago, Robert Dahl questioned whether the Supreme Court in fact
plays the countermajoritarian role our legitimizing narrative assigns to it. Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, J. PUB.
L. 279 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 579-81 (2001). Specifically, Dahl compared
the preferences of national "lawmaking majori[ties]" (determined by looking at the prefer-
ences of the President and the majority members of the House of Representatives and the
U.S. Senate). See id. at 569-77. When comparing these preferences to decisions in which the
Supreme Court invalidated federal laws, he found that the Court's decisions rarely deviated
from the preference of the elected officials. See id. at 577. When they did, he noted that the
laws being invalidated usually were the work of what he called "dead" majorities, meaning
2009]
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of constitutional interpretation routinely fail in practice to eliminate judicial dis-
cretion.2" It thus appears that the Court simply does not do what the conventional
that the statutes being struck down were more than four years old. Id. at 571-72. In invalidating
such statutes, Dahl speculated, the Court may well have been playing a majoritarian role in
keeping laws in alignment with current preferences. Id. at 571-73. Thus, Dahl concluded,
the Supreme Court, rather than protecting powerless minorities against majority tyranny, serves
mainly to strengthen the preferences of the ruling coalition by lending its legitimacy to that
coalition's agenda. Id. at 580-81. For sources updating, confirming, and discussing the essential
findings of Dahl's work, see Neal Devins, Is Judicial Policymaking Countermajoritarian,
in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 189 (Mark C. Miller &
Jeb Barnes eds., 2004) (discussing the theory that when the Court overturns legislation they
are often acting according to majoritarian forces); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION
AND THE SUPREME COURT 79-80 (1989); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 132 (Samuel Levinson ed., 4th ed. 2005); Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and
National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976) (claiming Dahl's theory ignores
relevant evidence and that the Court takes on a larger policy-making role than Dahl suggests);
Friedman, supra note 18, at 188-89; Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations
on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 325, 331-33 (1999); Whittington & Clark, supra note 19. It is worth noting that we have
not always obsessed over the allegedly countermajoritarian nature of Supreme Court decisions.
See Friedman, supra note 18, at 157; see also LARRYD. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEw 221-23 (2004). Barry Friedman has
exhaustively documented this dialogical nature of most Supreme Court decision-making. See
Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 19; see also KRAMER, supra, at 234 (noting that there is no
such thing as perfect finality in law and that uncertainty and change will exist even in a system
ofjudicial supremacy).
2 The classic critique of originalism as an effective constraint on judicial discretion is
Paul Brest's The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204
(1980) (identifying numerous problems with original intent as a theory of interpretation, includ-
ing the difficulty of conceptualizing a single intent within a collective group); see also FALLON,
supra note 12, at 13-25 (discussing the limitations of originalist theories in constitutional
interpretation); DANIEL A. FARBER& SUZANNA SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1-9 (2002) (demonstrating how originalism,
constitutional libertarianism (as advocated primarily by Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett),
constitutional dualism (as advocated by Bruce Ackerman) and moral philosophy (as advocated
by Ronald Dworkin) each strive toward, but fail to attain, constitutional determinacy); PERETrI,
supra note 10, at 42; MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRTICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148(1988); Balkin, supra note 4, at 514-15; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189,
1214-15 (1987); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism,
36 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 113, 133 (2002); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885,948 (1985) (arguing that the framers' theory of inter-
pretation rejected originalism); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Original Intent in the First Congress, 71
Mo. L. REV. 687, 691 (2006) (finding that most discussion of the original intent in the first
Congress involved the general policies embodied in the Constitution, not the specific words
or meanings thereof); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL.
L. REV. 1599 (1989) (arguing that both originalists and nonoriginalists are seeking the same
[Vol. 18:131
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narrative says it does: it does not use methods of interpretation to identify fixed
constitutional rules and impose those rules against otherwise-inclined majorities.
The main case against an ideologically-based confirmation process thus turns
out to be dependent on a largely discredited vision of the Supreme Court. After all,
if Supreme Court Justices are not using objective interpretive methods to find and
impose fixed constitutional constraints, but rather are (at best) exercising reasoned
discretion in under-determinate areas of law and (at worst) imposing their own pre-
ferred policy choices in the name of the Constitution, then surely the people and their
representatives can claim some right to guide that process by ascertaining the ideo-
logical preferences of nominees before confirming them to a lifetime position on the
high court. Independence-based objections to ideological confirmation hearings,
dependent as they are on the asserted need to isolate the judicial selection process
from all such influence, cannot survive the failure of the conventional narrative.
The failure of the conventional narrative does more than remove this objection
however. It also opens up the opportunity to reconceptualize the confirmation pro-
cess in a way in which the use of ideology is notjust unobjectionable, but is norma-
tively and theoretically desirable. It presents, in other words, an opportunity to build
a positive case for an ideologically-based confirmation process. This positive case
builds on evolving alternative narratives of constitutional law-narratives that are
taking seriously the insights of empirical legal scholarship and attempting to re-
construct a story of judicial power that rests on a realistic understanding of how the
Supreme Court actually functions. It is to these narratives that we will now turn.
B. Evolving Narratives
The failure of the conventional narrative has, as noted above, led contemporary
legal scholars to grope for new ways of understanding the process of constitutional
lawmaking, ways that better accommodate the realities of how the Supreme Court
actually functions.22 Some of these efforts have focused on encouraging political
scientists to develop their models more carefully to account for the possibility that
law, political institutions, and judicial acculturation impose restraints on the policy
result when interpreting the Constitution); Michael C. Dorf, An InstitutionalApproach to Legal
Indeterminacy (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper
No. 02-44, 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=326780
(demonstrating the indeterminacy of process theories (advocated by John Hart Ely) andjudicial
minimalism (advocated by Cass Sunstein)).
22 Charles Black was one ofthe first to recognize the clash between the conventional under-
standing of judicial review and the insights of legal realism, asking whether it is "prudent
notwithstanding our new insights into the nature of law, to continue to refer questions of con-
stitutional power and permissibility... to a body so manned and placed as is the Court?" He
concluded that it was. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 169 (1960).
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choices made byjudicial actors that successfully differentiate those actors from elected
officials.23 Others have focused on various instrumentalist rationales explaining why
other political actors tolerate judicial review.24
This work has been valuable, but the language of law requires more than a de-
scriptive or instrumentalist story of how judicial review functions or why it is tol-
erated; it requires a normatively desirable legal story as well.25 Taking law seriously
requires a principled way to talk about judicial power as a legal, not just a political,
concept.26 Some constitutional theorists, consequently, have been working to de-
velop alternative approaches to constitutional lawmaking that explain the exercise
of judicial power, particularly the power of judicial review, without depending on
the problematic assumptions embedded in the conventional narrative.
This scholarship varies tremendously, but it can be usefully divided into two
broadly defined groups: "New Originalist" approaches and "developmentalist" ap-
proaches.27 The delineation of these two groups, and the decision to focus on them
in the following discussion, is not unproblematic. The first difficulty is that the two
groups sometimes overlap.28 Jack Balkin's work, discussed below, reflects elements
23 See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS, NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); Barry Friedman, The
Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257 (2005).
24 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns . . .": The Political
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003).
25 William Marshall captured this thought in his argument against allowing the insights
of legal realism to legitimize the use of ideology in the confirmation process. Marshall argued
that the purely descriptive story of legal realism cannot provide Justices with a normatively
desirable vision of the unique role of the Court in our governing system, and that endorsing
ideological confirmations would thus discourage Justices from even aspiring to do anything
other than impose their political viewpoints on the rest of us. See William P. Marshall,
Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 525 (2005).
26 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261 (2006).
27 These classifications were drawn by Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1210. While I share Professor Griffin's expressed reluctance to add new
labels to constitutional theory, I also share his conclusion that the approaches he deems
"developmental" are sufficiently like each other to warrant their recognition as a group, and
also are, as a group, sufficiently unlike their predecessor (living constitutionalism) to justify
a new term.
28 As Griffin has pointed out, there is a significant amount of imprecision in a dichoto-
mous framing between "originalists" and "developmentalists." See id. In regard to issues of
interpretation, therefore, the distinction between originalists and others may be more one of
linguistics and emphasis than of kind. In regard to issues of legitimacy, however, the dichotomy
is more appropriate. Both the old and the new originalists link the legitimacy ofjudicial review
to the ability of Supreme Court Justices to ground their decisions in the original meaning of
the Constitution. See id. at 1219. Developmentalists source the legitimacy ofjudicial review
elsewhere. See id. Even here, however, there is overlap. Some of Bruce Ackerman's critics
see traces of originalism in his approach, in that he continues to link judicial review to dis-
tinct moments of constitutional creation even though his work reflects a developmentalist
[Vol. 18:131
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 138 2009-2010
IN DEFENSE OF IDEOLOGY
of both New Originalism (the group in which he places himself) and developmental-
ism. 29 Likewise, Bruce Ackerman, whose work is presented here as exemplary of the
developmentalist approach, has been assailed by some of his critics for being essen-
tially originalist.3° The second difficulty is that there is much contemporary consti-
tutional scholarship that is not encompassed by either of these categories. My focus
on these two areas to the exclusion of other work is thus admittedly underinclusive.
Despite these problems, the focus on New Originalism and developmentalism
is justifiable here for two reasons. First, these approaches are the contemporary heirs
to the two paradigmatic constitutional movements of the recent past--originalism and
living constitutionalism. 31 Second, scholars working within these two frameworks
are the most directly engaged in the project at issue here-the explication of norma-
tively desirable alternative approaches to constitutional lawmaking in light of the
failure of the conventional narrative.
1. The New Originalists
The New Originalists are the more cohesive of the two groups. Led by Keith
Whittington and Lawrence Solum, New Originalists argue that the Constitution must
be interpreted in accordance with the likely understandings of the general public at
the time of the ratification of the relevant textual provision.32 Unlike earlier origi-
nalists, however, New Originalists have accepted that this approach will not always
approach. See id. at 1210. For a more detailed discussion of these overlaps and differences, see
generally id. See also Michael C. Dorf, IntegratingNormative andDescriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997).
29 For a discussion of Balkin's work, see Ethan J. Leib, The PerpetualAnxiety ofLiving
Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007).
30 See Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918 (1992)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
3' New Originalism--as evidenced by its name-embraces its heritage explicitly. Develop-
mentalism's link to living constitutionalism is less direct, but equally present. See Griffm,
supra note 27, at 1209-10 (recognizing the connection and articulating differences between
the two); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1737
(2007); Stephen M. Griffin, The Bush Presidency and Theories of Constitutional Change 15,
27 (Tulane Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=-1341983 (citing Ernest Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117
YALE L.J. 408, 449 (2007)) (linking Karl Llewellyn's notion of a "working constitution" as
a "living institution" to later work attempting to explain constitutional change outside of the
Article V amendment process).
32 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 90-94 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 18 (111. Pub. Law Working
Paper Series, PaperNo. 07-24,2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract= 1120244.
For a general discussion ofunder-determinacy, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminancy
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 473 (1987).
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generate determinate outcomes to constitutional questions; they accept, in other words,
the practical limitations of their preferred interpretive method.33
Rather than decrying as "illegitimate" the under-determinacy in judicial decision-
making resulting from this (which was more or less the response of the original
originalists34), New Originalists instead resort to the following distinction: when the
original public meaning of a constitutional provision does not yield a relatively deter-
minative answer to a constitutional question, or when it does so at such a high level
of abstraction that the provision is nonetheless rendered under-determinate in relation
to the question presented, the resolution of the question must be referred to as an act
of constitutional "construction," not constitutional "interpretation., 35
This distinction-the refusal to label as "interpretation" any constitutional reason-
ing not traceable to original public meaning-is key to the New Originalist approach.
It is how, in light of the failure of the conventional narrative, New Originalists reconcile
constitutional under-determinacy with the viability of originalism as an interpretive
method.36 It also is the method they use to meet the practical need to accept as legiti-
mate volumes of existing constitutional law which, while not obviously contrary to
any ascertainable original public meaning, is nonetheless not directly tied to it.37
31 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CoNsTTuTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REvIEw 171-72 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader's
Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 2 (I11. Pub. Law Working
Paper Series, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l 130665. This limitation can stem
from different things. Sometimes the original public meaning of a constitutional provision will
be contested or otherwise unknowable. See id, at 40. Other times it will be pitched at such
a high level of generalization that it is not particularly useful in actual cases. See id. Solum
acknowledges that "much of the important work of constitutional practice must be done by
construction, the crafting of specific rules or practices that allow for the application ofconsti-
tutional provisions which are vague." Id. Originalists argue about which constitutional pro-
visions raise these problems. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008). However, originalists do agree that when they are present, consti-
tutional fidelity requires that the relevant provision be understood as either incapable of an
originalist interpretation or as encompassing the full breadth oftheprinciple it was originally
understood to embody. See Solum, supra, at 2.
" Herbert Wechsler and Robert Bork are among those who have taken this approach. See
Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and
NeglectedRelationship, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 309,325 (2002) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE,
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000)) (noting that Wechsler advocated a
theory ofjudicial power that he admitted courts had never followed, and noting that Bork has
described "the history ofjudicial review as a 200-year reign of error").
35 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 5-7; see also BARNETT, supra note 32, at 118-30;
Solum, supra note 32, at 67-69.
36 Solum, supra note 33, at 40. ("[M]uch of the important work of constitutional practice
must be done by construction, the crafting of specific rules or practices that allow for the
application of constitutional provisions which are vague.").
" See WHIrTHNGTON, supra note 33, at 171-72; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism
is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2009) (criticizing New Originalism for this move); Griffin,
supra note 27, at 1216-17.
[Vol. 18:131
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 140 2009-2010
IN DEFENSE OF IDEOLOGY
New Originalism thus successfully responds to much of the criticism leveled at
its predecessor. It acknowledges the under-determinacy of its preferred method of
constitutional interpretation, and it accommodates changes in constitutional law
through the use of non-interpretative constitutional constructions.
The value of New Originalism as an alternate constitutional narrative, however,
is limited by the uncertainty with which New Originalists approach what Lawrence
Solum has called the "construction zone"-the area in which issues not resolvable
through interpretation (as defined within the theory) are addressed.38 Many New
Originalists do not provide a normative theory of constitutional construction.39 More-
over, those New Originalists who do address the process of constitutional construction
differ significantly on what factors should guide it.a° Consequently, as a group, the
New Originalists give little guidance to judges regarding how questions requiring
constitutional construction are to be approached. 41 Depending on the size of a given
New Originalist's "construction zone," this theoretic blank spot leaves potentially
large swaths of the actual work done by courts in constitutional cases beyond the
normative scope of the theory.42
38 Solum, supra note 33, at 6, 40.
9 See id, at 27 (noting that his version of New Originalism, semantic originalism, does not
include a normative theory of construction). Whittington has exhaustively detailed constitu-
tional construction outside the courts, but disavows, and therefore does not discuss, legitimate
acts ofjudicial construction. See KErrHE. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POwERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
40 See Solum, supra note 33, at 27 ("Different New Originalists have different norma-
tive views about constitutional construction. Barnett emphasizes constitutional legitimacy;
Whittington emphasizes deference to politics; Balkin emphasizes the role of constitutional
principles.").
41 See id., at 40. Solum acknowledges that "much of the important work of constitutional
practice must be done by construction, the crafting of specific rules or practices that allow
for the application of constitutional provisions which are vague." Id. See also WHrrrINGTON,
supra note 39. As Stephen Griffin has said, "One could read Whittington's entire book...
without gaining an understanding of how a lawyer is supposed to analyze a given constitu-
tional case or a judge is supposed to render a decision. The practice of constitutional law is
not addressed." Griffin, supra note 26, at 1191.
42 See Griffin, supra note 27, at 1198-99. Solum acknowledges this. While maintaining that
New Originalism, like old originalism, is committed to constitutional fixity, he acknowledges
that the knowable core of fixed constitutional meaning will not generate determinate answers
to many constitutional questions. Solum, supra note 33, at 32 (noting that "semantic originalism
underdetermines outcomes, so there will be a variety of cases in which a range of outcomes is
consistent with the semantic content of the Constitution"). To give one pointed example of this,
consider the divergence of opinion among prominent New Originalists about the constitu-
tionality of abortion rights. Jack Balkin and Randy Barnett agree with the outcome in Roe and
find that the original public meaning of the Constitution protects judicially enforceable abortion
rights. See BARNETr, supra note 32, at 232-34; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,299 (2007). Solum posits that a New Originalist Justice
could disagree with Roe as inconsistent with original meaning, thus allowing the Justices to
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Some New Originalists, such as Solum, are not particularly troubled by this.
Solum's mission is not to develop a normative theory of constitutional decision
making, but rather to provide a theoretical account of the linguistic meaning of the
constitution and to thereby clarify how we talk about what courts do.43
Others take different tacks. Whittington avoids thejudicial construction problem
by limiting the role of courts in enforcing provisions requiring construction." Randy
Barnett argues that a better understanding of what he sees as the rights-protective
original public meaning of the Constitution overall (and the Ninth Amendment in
particular45) would in fact enable most constitutional disputes to be answered through
acts of interpretation, thus reducing the need to engage in problematic constructions.'
Still others, most notably Jack Balkin, agree with Barnett that the meaning of many--or
perhaps most-constitutional provisions can be derived through interpretation not
construction, but then interpret those provisions at such a high level of generality
that they become as under-determinate in actual cases as are the questions their peers
relegate to the construction zone.47
strip it of the precedential respect that prior decisions of the Supreme Court are otherwise
entitled to. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 201 (2006). Keith Whittington appears to believe that the Constitution does not speak
to the abortion issue in judicially enforceable terms, thus leaving the issue entirely to the
political realm. WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 162 (noting that "the exercise of the power
ofjudicial review is unnecessary in the absence of reliable evidence of intent").
" Solum, supra note 32, at 1-2; see also Solum, supra note 42, at 168-69. Solum has
said that his version of New Originalism-semantic originalism-is not a "theory of consti-
tutional practice." See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic andNormative Originalism: Comments
onBrianLeiter's "Justifying Originalism, "LEGAL THEORY BLOG, Oct. 30, 2007, http://lsolum
.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html.
" Whittington is not entirely clear on this point, but this appears to be his approach.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 33, at 160-68; see also BARNETT, supra note 32, at 121-23
(discussing Whittington's work).
" See BARNETT, supra note 32, at 234-58 (2004) (arguing that the original meaning of
the Ninth Amendment has been persuasively developed). Barnett argues later in the book and
elsewhere that that meaning contains the founding generation's commitment to natural rights
and thereby creates a presumption of liberty through which both the Ninth Amendment and
constructions of other constitutional provisions should be evaluated. See id at 254; see also
Randy E. Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND THE MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (1993); Randy E.
Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY
THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (1989).
' See BARNETT, supra note 32, at 54. In making this argument, Barnett emphasizes his
understanding that the original meaning of the Constitution, specifically the Ninth Amendment,
included an expansive understanding of the constitutionalization of natural rights. Id. at 54.
41 See Balkin, supra note 4, at 453. Balkin's goal is to reconcile originalism with living con-
stitutionalism. He does this by arguing that fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution
requires adherence to constitutional principles at whatever level of generality they were
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The difficulty with all of this, in terms of New Originalism's success in creating
an alternative narrative of judicial power, is that each of these approaches (with the
exception of Whittington's) reintroduces many of the same problems of historical un-
certainty and constitutional under-determinacy that rendered originalism problematic
as an interpretive method in the first place.4" Whittington's approach avoids that par-
ticular problem, but in doing so renders much of our existing judge-made constitu-
tional law presumptively illegitimate.4 9 New Originalism would thus benefit by a
mechanism through which the discretionary acts of courts engaged in constitutional
constructions could be guided and legitimated-a mechanism a reconceptualized
approach to the confirmation process can provide.
originally understood. Id. at 449, 493-98. Consequently, to Balkin, being an originalist neces-
sarily encompasses respecting the indeterminacy inherent in constitutional principles which
were themselves originally understood in a vague or highly abstract way. Id. at 491-98. To
refuse to enforce such provisions because of the uncertainty inherent in doing so is to disrespect
original meaning. Id. at 491; see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of
Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 11 (2006). Thus, Balkin's New Originalism
works to reconcile originalism and living constitutionalism. Balkin, supra note 4, at 428. In
doing so, however, he openly rejects the search for strong constraints on judicial discretion
that so motivated the original originalists, turning instead to citizen and social movements as
the first sources of constitutional interpretation. See id at 503-16; see also id. at 458 (noting
that constitutions are designed to "channel and discipline future political judgment, not
forestall it").
48 For a similar critique, see Tushnet, supra note 33, at 610-11. Consider also the New
Originalists' work on the Commerce Clause. Jack Balkin believes the original public meaning
of that clause gives Congress broad regulatory power. Balkin, supra note 4, at 431 & n. 13
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and Akhil Reed Amar, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005)). Randy Barnett takes a much more restrictive view.
See BARNETT, supra note 32, at 278-91.
'9 This is so for two reasons. First, like original originalism, Whittington's approach appears
to require the disavowal of much of our existing constitutional law. Second, it is unclear in
Whittington's work how a court is to engage with constitutional constructions after they have
been adopted by political actors outside of the courts. See WHrITINGTON, supra note 39, at
167-73 (an example of his discussion ofprecedent); id, at 173-79 (discussion of prior consti-
tutional "settlements"); id. at 213 (noting that political constructions do matter to constitutional
outcomes but not elaborating on how, if at all, courts are to approach even well-settled political
constructions ofour Constitution). This leaves open the question ofwhether there ever comes
a time when courts should enforce constitutional constructions that have developed and been
embraced outside of the courts. For example, should courts today enforce well-accepted deci-
sions that were almost certainly inconsistent with original public meaning, such as Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (the companion case to Brown v. BoardofEducation, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)), that invalidated racial discrimination in the District ofColumbia? Whittington's
failure to address this issue leaves his approach open to the same problems of ad hoc accep-
tance of imperfect prior decisions that plague original originalism. Stephen Griffm also has
made this point. See Griffin, supra note 27, at 1191.
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2. The Developmentalists
Developmentalism is a very big tent, and developmentalist scholars differ from
each other in more ways than do the New Originalists." But each of these theorists
shares a common trait that distinguishes them from the New Originalists-they
acknowledge and accept as legitimate constitutional change outside of the Article V
amendment process.5 This sets developmentalists apart from New Originalists in two
important ways. First, developmentalists source changes in constitutional under-
standing in a wide array of social and political actions, with no particular priority
necessarily given to the originally understood public meaning of the constitutional
text.52 Second, and relatedly, developmentalists therefore are not as concerned as
New Originalists with drawing crisp distinctions between acts of "construction" and
acts of "interpretation."53
Bruce Ackerman's work perhaps best exemplifies the developmentalist approach.'
Ackerman rejects the conventional story of the Supreme Court as a false narrative of
constitutional continuity that treats significant constitutional changes not as changes
at all, but rather as judicial rediscoveries of fixed constitutional truths." This story
of constitutional continuity is, as Ackerman notes, appealing precisely because of
its insistence on the fixity of constitutional meaning.56 As Ackerman recognizes,
50 Developmentalists include scholars who support judicial supremacy and those who do
not. For examples of the former, see Leib, supra note 29, at 360; Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373
(2007) (discussing the cyclical reinforcement of constitutional enforcement and the Court's
role); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy Uncaged (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Pub., Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-04,2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1338130
(book review). For examples of the latter, consider the "popular constitutionalism" approaches
developed by Mark Tushnet, Larry Kramer, and as noted in Post & Siegel, supra at 373 & n.3,
as well as Bruce Ackerman (discussed infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text), and others.
5' See Griffin, supra note 27, at 1209, 1219.
52 See id. at 1220; see also Dorf, supra note 28, at 1770, 1788-94 (describing develop-
mentalist theory through an examination of Philip Bobbit's theories).
13 See Griffin, supra note 27, at 1218-20.
"' As noted above, there also are strands of originalism in Ackerman's approach, and
some of his critics have considered him an originalist. See Sherry, supra note 30, at 928. That
critique is correct, in that Ackerman, like the originalists, does look for foundational moments
to ground constitutional meaning and ties his constitutional interpretation to those moments
rather than to concepts of common law or moral philosophy. His approach is distinctly develop-
mentalist, however, in that it finds such foundational moments outside of the formal Article V
amendment process. For a discussion of Ackerman's work in this regard, see Griffim, supra
note 27, at 1209. See also Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE
L.J. 2115, 2142-47 & n.131 (1999).
" See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
457-58 (1989).
56 See id. at 457-67 (noting the popularity of this interpretational story in the context of
the New Deal).
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however, a narrative of continuity is deeply inconsistent with the reality of our con-
stitutional experience-the one in which constitutional law changes.5 7 The fagade
of continuity is thus at best a reassuring fiction. 8
Armed with this assessment of the situation, Ackerman set out to bridge the gap
between the conventional narrative and constitutional law as it actually operates. 9
His goal was to develop a theory that could accommodate the fact of constitutional
change while preserving the constitutionalist distinction between ordinary and con-
stitutional law. 60 He did so by arguing that certain moments in history are so sig-
nificant that they constitute moments of "higher lawmaking"-times when "We the
People" are sufficiently engaged and committed to a governing project that our actions
effectuate a constitutional change.6'
Preserving constitutionalism, however, required Ackerman to find a way to dis-
tinguish these moments from ordinary fluctuations in the political preferences of the
public. Ackerman did this by identifying five stages that a political movement must
go through before it can be deemed a moment of higher lawmaking: signaling, pro-
posing, triggering, ratifying, and consolidating.62 These stages serve to ensure that
the People are sufficiently aware, mobilized, and approving of a constitutional change
before it is acknowledged as such. 63 Once a political movement successfully navi-
gates all five stages, however, it is fully incorporated as part of the Constitution.'
As with judicial decision-making within the New Originalists' "construction
zone," there is an unfortunate imprecision to this. 6 Ackerman's five stages are both
vague and, at least as originally articulated, stringent.66 As such, the theory has
7 See id. at 471.
58 See id. (describing how what is perceived as continuity is really a deliberative process
that serves to re-entrench fundamental rights of Americans).
" See id. at 456-57; see also Griffin, supra note 54, at 2117-19 (calling Ackerman's
thesis the "restoration thesis, or restorationism").
60 See Ackerman, supra note 55, at 456-57; see also Griffin, supra note 54, at 2117-19.
61 See Ackerman, supra note 55, at 461.
62 See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1762. Ackerman originally articulated this as a four-
stage process: signaling, proposing, deliberating, and codifying. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 266-69 (1998); see also Sherry, supra note 30, at 929.
63 See ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 4-5 (explaining how his theory of higher lawmaking
culminates in acceptance by We the People).
4 See id. at 268-69 (describing the ultimate incorporation of the New Deal through key
Supreme Court decisions).
65 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitu-
tionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand Can the People be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
313 (2008) (discussing and attempting to clarify popular constitutionalism). See also Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1079-83 (2001) (describing the difficulties in using Ackerman's theory); Griffin, supra
note 54, at 2146-47 (describing the gaps in Ackerman's theory); supra note 42 and accom-
panying text (discussing the imprecision in New Originalist theory).
" See Sherry, supra note 30, at 929-30. It appears that Ackerman maybe reducing the rigor
of the five-stage test. His early writings emphasized the relative rarity of moments of higher
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limited ability to legitimate the decisions of Justices struggling to answer constitu-
tional questions presented in actual cases, particularly those doing so without the
benefit of historical perspective.67 Other developmentalists have had similar diffi-
culty articulating a mechanism through which the social and political movements their
theories rely on are legitimately translated into constitutional law.68 This imprecision
weakens the link, so essential to Ackerman and other developmentalists, between the
will of the people and the fact of constitutional change: if the Court cannot easily
identify moments of higher lawmaking, then judge-made constitutional change can
look more like change by judicial fiat than by the engaged action of We the People.
New Originalism and developmentalism thus in some ways share the same bene-
fits and the same flaw. Both work to incorporate within their approaches a realistic
understanding of the actual operation of the Supreme Court.69 Both accept the under-
determinacy of interpretive methods and acknowledge that Supreme Court Justices
necessarily make choices when deciding at least some constitutional cases.7" Finally,
both accept the fact of changes in constitutional law outside of the Article V amend-
ment process, although New Originalists label such changes acts of constitutional
construction rather than constitutional interpretation.7'
But both approaches also have a similar flaw: they lack a satisfying device
through which constitutional changes are considered and accepted as legal changes.
Most New Originalists do not even attempt to make this connection, either pushing
such changes into the under-developed construction zone or legitimizing them only
when undertaken in the political realm.72 Developmentalists take the problem more
seriously, but their work as of yet has not provided a mechanism that is both suffi-
ciently concrete and theoretically satisfying.73 It is the premise of this paper that an
lawmaking. Id. His later work, however, uses the same multistage test to extend constitutional
status to landmark statutes (notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and so-called "mandates
from the People." Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1775.
67 Ackerman has emphasized that periods of higher lawmaking stretch over decades. See
Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1763. For a discussion of the interpretive difficulties this creates,
see Dorf, supra note 28, at 1768 (noting that Ackerman's approach does not generate inter-
pretive principles and is more a theory of legitimacy than of interpretation). Ackerman appears
to be aware of this, but he addresses this critique only by invoking the shallow democratic
credentials of much legislation. See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1805. Most ordinary legis-
lation, he argues, does not reflect the considered judgment of the People. Consequently, it is not
antidemocratic for the Court to strike down such legislation as inconsistent with the more
thoughtful commitments made by the People in moments of higher lawmaking. See also
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1079-82.
68 See Pettys, supra note 65, at 332-34 (noting the continuing lack of precision in the way
various developmentalists link social movements to constitutional change).
69 Compare id. at 316-17 (developmentalist), with Solum, supra note 21, at 1621-22
(originalist).
70 Compare Pettys, supra note 65, at 320, with Solum, supra note 21, at 1622.
"' Compare Pettys, supra note 65, at 332-33, with Griffin, supra note 27, at 1211.
72 See Griffin, supra note 27, at 1217.
73 Jack Balkin, Sandford Levinson, Reva Siegel and Robert Post have all discussed, as
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ideological confirmation process can provide one such mechanism. It is to that issue
that we will now turn.
II. A PRINCIPLED DEFENSE OF AN IDEOLOGICAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
This section builds on Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson's theory of "partisan
entrenchment." 74 Balkin and Levinson examined how political parties who hold
power for extended periods of time use Supreme Court appointments to entrench their
constitutional preferences. 75 My goal in this Part is to demonstrate how a more com-
pletely theorized understanding of an ideological confirmation process can extend that
insight beyond the descriptive and provide a normative defense of such a process. In
doing so, I also will argue that both New Originalist and developmentalist theories
would benefit by embracing the reconceptualization of the confirmation process
offered here.
The idea developed here does not purport to be a theory of constitutional interpre-
tation, nor is it primarily a mechanism by which to control the discretion of individual
Justices. Rather, it offers a normatively appealing explanation of how an ideological
confirmation process can fill gaps in our evolving constitutional narratives by accom-
modating constitutional change while preserving the notions, essential to our under-
standing of our legal system, of both constitutionalism and self-governance.
A confirmation-based narrative, broadly speaking, operates as follows. Major
constitutional changes made by the Court since the last Supreme Court vacancy will
be the subject of attention at subsequent confirmation hearings. If the nation approves
of the Court's changes, adherence to them will become a prerequisite to future con-
firmations. If such approval is sufficiently long-lasting, the changes will become en-
trenched on the Court and will become the country's new constitutional consensus.
If, on the other hand, the public disapproves of them, or if its approval is not suffi-
ciently deep or broad to survive changing political regimes, the change will not be
absorbed and the Court's constitutional change will be rejected.
When viewed through this framework, constitutional decisions can be seen as
something akin to "constitutional proposals" made by the Justices to the country.76
Over time, the country will either accept those constitutional proposals and incorporate
adherence to them into the confirmation process, or it will reject them by refusing to
a descriptive matter, the role the confirmation process plays in this process. See Balkin &
Levinson, supra note 65, at 1068-70; Post & Siegel, supra note 50, at 375-76.
4 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1066.
7 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson's work on partisan entrenchment posits that, as
a descriptive matter, this is precisely how constitutional law changes over time. See id. at
1066-68; see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489
(2006) (offering an updated analysis of their theory of partisan entrenchment).
76 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1067-68.
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confirm nominees who advocate them." Judicial power, in this narrative, is different
than legislative or executive power, but is legitimized by the same basic mechanism:
the regular and effective opportunity for a democratically-controlled check over how
it is exercised. Confirmation hearings under this approach will become what Justice
Scalia once bemoaned they were turning into: mini constitutional conventions during
which We the People decide what we want the open-ended phrases of the Constitution
to mean. 8
In this narrative, the under-determinacy inherent in much of our constitutional
text, acknowledged by both New Originalists and developmentalists, is not particu-
larly troubling. The discretion necessarily exercised by the Justices is channeled on
a cycling basis through the democratically-credentialed confirmation process. This
ensures that the public will have regular and ongoing opportunities to evaluate how
that discretion is exercised and, if desired, to incorporate acceptance or rejection of
the Court's constitutional changes into future confirmation decisions.
Like New Originalism and developmentalism, this narrative also takes seriously the
need to preserve the distinction between constitutional and ordinary law. It does so by
ensuring that only those constitutional changes that enjoy deep public support for an
extended period of time become entrenched in our constitutional consensus-only a
political movement holding power across two branches of government for a significant
period of time will be able to effectuate a constitutional change by "stacking" the Court.
Unlike those approaches, however, an ideologically-based approach to the confirma-
tion process accomplishes this in a way that tangibly connects constitutional change
to a specific moment (the confirmation process) at which the public and its elected
officials are uniquely focused on public policy choices as constitutional choices.79
Ifan ideological confirmation process can accomplish this-if it can help evolving
constitutional narratives cope with the failure of the conventional story by providing a
mechanism through which deeply held yet changing public values can be legitimately
" As noted above, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued that this is in fact how
constitutional law changes over time. See id, at 1067-68; see also Friedman, Mediated
Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 19, at 2609 (noting that the appointment process ensures
a connection between popular opinion and judicial opinions).
78 MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
27 (2004) ("[W]e are.., having a plebiscite on the meaning of the Constitution every time
a justice is nominated and that's crazy."). Then-Senator Joseph Biden, chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee from 1987 to 1995, has embraced this view, calling Supreme Court
confirmation hearings "town meeting[s]" on the meaning of the Constitution. Stephen J.
Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role ofthe Senate Judiciary Committee, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 121, 122 & n.8.
" Public awareness ofthe Court and constitutional controversies is high during contested
confirmation hearings. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme
Court? A Reconsideration ofPublic Ignorance of the High Court, Feb. 9,2008, available at
http://www.polisci.wustl.edu/media/download.php?page=faculty&paper= 123(collecting
research finding the same).
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transformed into constitutional law-then such a process would be normatively defen-
sible and theoretically useful to both New Originalists and developmentalists. It would
help developmentalists by providing a tangible point at which "the People" can con-
cretely contribute to constitutional change. It would help New Originalists by provid-
ing a principled way to guide and legitimize changes in constitutional constructions.
Can an ideological confirmation process accomplish these things? The remainder
of this paper argues that such a process not only can do so, but that it frequently-
indeed throughout much of our history-has played precisely this role.
A. Confirmation Questions
If the confirmation process is to successfully provide a mechanism through which
the public's evolving constitutional preferences are translated over time into consti-
tutional law, then it is important that the public have some opportunity to evaluate
the ideological preferences of the nominee being confirmed. This opportunity is
most readily provided through the confirmation hearings conducted by the Senate
Judiciary Committee."° The senators engaged in questioning the nominees at these
hearings arc well-versed in constitutional issues, they are keenly aware that they are
speaking both to and for their constituents, and they frequently determine whether a
nominee will or will not be allowed to take a place on the Supreme Court. l
The constitutional questions posed by senators at these hearings tend to take two
forms: questions about areas of law that were initially controversial but are now
well-settled, and questions involving currently controversial constitutional issues.82
Each of these types of questions contributes-albeit quite differently-to the ability
of the confirmation process to play the role set out for it here.
1. Settled Issues
Questions in this category require the nominee to either accept or reject the
existing constitutional resolution of a previously controversial issue. Some of the
80 Presidents and senators have multiple sources of information about the views of Supreme
Court nominees, and it is questionable whether those actors acquire much additional infor-
mation during the confirmation hearings. The hearings do, however, give the public a more
direct way to evaluate the nominee's positions, and, as discussed below, to hold senators elec-
torally accountable for their confirmation votes. Thus, while an open confirmation hearing
is not essential to the narrative developed here-the public could hold senators accountable
for their conduct even without a direct window into a nominee's views-an open process
seems likely to enhance the ability of the public to do so. It also is more able to contribute to
the evolution of constitutional dialogue, as discussed infra Part II.A. 1.
"' See Nagel, supra note 3, at 862-65 (discussing the Senate's qualifications to inquire
about the judicial philosophy ofnominees, and its role injudging a nominee's ability to change
the Court for better or worse).
82 See Lori A. Ringhand, "I'm Sorry, I Can't Answer That": Positive Scholarship and
the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 340 & n.27 (2008).
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issues or cases addressed in these questions will have been controversial when made
(Brown);8 3 others will have come over time to stand for subsequently repudiated prin-
ciples (Plessy4 and Lochner85). But in either scenario, the key point is that the pub-
lic has now reached a broad and deep consensus on what the constitutionally correct
resolution of the issue is.
These questions represent the most straightforward illustration of the confirmation-
based narrative at work. The prior judicial decisions being accepted or repudiated
in these scenarios represent the quintessential "constitutional propositions" posited
above: the Court, faced with the need to generate a constitutional rule in an under-
determinate area of law, has exercised its discretion and issued its decision. Public
debate--often quite vigorous debate-about the propriety of that decision then ensued.
Over time, public opinion stabilized and a consensus on the issue was reached. From
that point forward (or for at least as long as the consensus holds) a nominee expecting
to be confirmed must signal in response to this type of question that he or she con-
curs with the hard-won public consensus and will behave accordingly if confirmed.
The failure of a nominee to make such an affirmation will almost certainly-and
appropriately-doom the nomination.
The fifty-year saga of Brown v. Board ofEducation illustrates this point.8 6 Con-
sider the way Brown has been used at the confirmation hearings in the more than half-
century since that case was decided. Potter Stewart, confirmed shortly after Brown,
was questioned extensively by Southern senators about his opinion of the case.87 He
avoided a direct response for some time, but ultimately informed the senators that
he was disinclined to overturn the case, and that those wanting such a result should
not vote for him.88 Despite a difficult confirmation hearing, only seventeen senators--
all from former Confederate states-ultimately voted against his appointment.8 9 Thus,
while the country at the time of the Stewart confirmation was still debating Brown
and the future of civil rights, Southern opposition to Brown was not strong enough
to make its rejection a condition of Justice Stewart's confirmation. The case was
one on which no constitutional consensus had been reached.
By 1985, however, support for Brown had solidified and affirmation of the case
had become a defacto prerequisite to confirmation. Justice Rehnquist, appearing
before the Senate that year as a nominee for Chief Justice, was required to repeatedly
83 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
86 See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
87 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 89.
88 See id.; Ringhand, supra note 82, at 355 n.91.
89 LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 289 (1994);
Ringhand, supra note 82, at 355 n.91.
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disavow previous writings expressing skepticism of the case.9° Robert Bork, testi-
fying two years later, felt compelled to explain in great detail how his narrow version
of originalism could be made consistent with the outcome in Brown.9' Even Justice
Scalia, who answered very few specific questions at his 1986 confirmation hearing,
felt it necessary to speak positively about Brown.92
Today, glowing endorsements of Brown have become standard fare at confirma-
tion hearings, regardless of the political inclinations and purported interpretive prefer-
ences of the nominee. 93 The country has embraced the constitutional proposition made
by the Court in Brown, and adherence to that proposition, while previously contro-
versial, is now expected and demanded of Supreme Court nominees. More to the
point, any nominee who refused to affirm Brown today would not be confirmed, and
any senator who voted for such a nominee would do so at their immediate electoral
peril. Brown is now part of our constitutional consensus, and its use as a litmus test
for confirmation is both expected and accepted.94
Many things, of course, contributed to society's acceptance of Brown and the
concept of racial equality it represents. What a confirmation-based narrative adds to
90 See Ringhand, supra note 82, at 347 (discussing the practice of the Rehnquist Court
nominees of willingly affirming their adherence to Brown and Lochner).
"' See Nomination ofRobert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 131-32 (1987)
(questioning by Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/common/generic/SChrgs.htm.
92 See Nomination ofAntonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2, 85-86 (1986)
[hereinafter Scalia Transcript] (statements ofJ. Scalia), available at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/common/generic/SChrgs.htm (criticizing Plessy v. Ferguson).
9' See Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 452 (2006)
[hereinafter Alito Transcript] (questioning by Sen. Richard Durbin, Member, S. Comm, on
the Judiciary), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/common/generic/SChrgs.htm;
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 167-68 (2005) (question-
ing by Sen. Ted Kennedy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://www.senate
.gov/reference/common/generic/SChrgs.htm.
9 See Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 15, at 1193. In fact, the worm has turned
so far on Brown that it is jarring to remember that the "colorblind" reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment advocated by today's constitutional formalists was rejected by the constitutional
formalists of 1954 as an insufficiently "neutral principle" on which to rest constitutional law-
making. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1959). Thus, the decision and the principle underlying it-that separate is
inherently unequal--has in fifty years gone from a deeply contested constitutional proposition
to such a mainstay of our constitutional understanding that it now forms the starting rather
than the ending point of our Fourteenth Amendment dialogue. See, e.g., Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 716-20 (2007).
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these explanations is a mechanism through which those societal changes were specifi-
cally contemplated as constitutional changes, and were accepted as such through a
democratically-controlled process operating over an extended period of time.
It is true that the cases addressed in this type of questioning frequently are being
accepted or rejected more for the symbolic principles they have come to stand for
than the precise legal point initially at issue in the case.95 This is particularly true the
farther in time a given confirmation is from the actual case being discussed.96 This
hardly, however, renders their affirmation (or rejection) meaningless. The affirma-
tion of Brown tells us that our constitutional consensus now requires that we accept
people of color as full and equal citizens under law, and that state-sanctioned race-
based subordination is consequently prohibited. It is important to recall that that
principle, which today seems too abstract to be of much practical use, was not part
of our constitutional consensus prior to, and immediately after, Brown. Acceptance
of it as such thus had real constitutional bite. Our distance from the original contro-
versy should not mask that fact.
2. Unsettled Issues
Many-maybe most-questions asked of nominees at their confirmation hearings
are very different, however. These questions involve issues on which no constitutional
consensus has been reached. They involve constitutional issues that are currently
and often bitterly contested, issues such as abortion, executive power, and the death
penalty today; or desegregation and subversive speech fifty years ago.97 A nominee
occasionally will respond directly to this type of question,9" but is more likely to
avoid speaking to the issue either by reciting existing law without opining on it, or
by stating that the need for impartiality in future cases prevents him or her from being
more responsive.99
These questions--or more accurately, the answers they provoke--obviously
cannot play the same role in the confirmation process as do questions requiring the
affirmation or rejection of prior cases or doctrines. These colloquies nonetheless
" Consider the recent fight in Parents Involved about the legacy of Brown. Each of the
Justices currently sitting on the Court would claim--did claim-fidelity with Brown. The
Justices nonetheless vehemently disagreed with each other about what the fidelity required
in the case presented. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 740-47 (Roberts, C.J.), 747-50
(Thomas, J., concurring), 797-802 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 802-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 See, e.g., Alito Transcript, supra note 93, at 379 (unequivocally denouncing Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
9' See, e.g., Ringhand, supra note 82, at 338-46.
98 See id. at 343. More frequently (but still rarely) a nominee will not answer such ques-
tions directly but will strongly indicate his or her preferences. Id. at 353 (discussing Justice
Ginsburg's relatively frank answer regarding her support of abortion rights).
99 I have argued elsewhere that this latter justification is not convincing. See id, at 354-56.
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contribute to the process. They do so by presenting two distinct and important
opportunities. First, they provide an opportunity for the senators to refuse to con-
firm nominees who will not answer their questions. Second, they provide an oppor-
tunity for a highly visible public discussion of contested constitutional proposals.
The first opportunity ensures public control over which branch of government makes
decisions in constitutionally contested areas; the second enables voters to "keep tabs"
on the constitutional issues they care about. Each of these opportunities is explored
further below.
a. Opportunity for Rejection
Senators confronted with a nominee who refuses to answer questions regarding
currently contested constitutional issues have a valuable, if infrequently used, weapon
at their disposal: they can vote against confirmation.' 0 Senators, of course, rarely use
this weapon; ideological disagreement is much more likely to generate a "no" vote
than is a refusal to answer questions.' The relevant point for the confirmation-based
narrative, however, is that the senators have the opportunity to reject a nominee on
this basis. 10 2 Thus, while a senatorial norm of pushing nominees to answer questions
about contested areas of constitutional law might improve the confirmation process,
it is not necessary to the narrative developed here.
The opportunity to reject a nominee who refuses to answer questions is significant
because it displays to voters what scholars of the Senate frequently assert-senators,
like other elected officials, are often quite happy to delegate the resolution of deeply
divisive issues to the Supreme Court. 0 3 Thus, when the Senate votes to confirm a
nominee who has refused to answer questions about a contested area of constitu-
tional law, the message being sent is simple: a majority of our senators have tem-
porarily delegated resolution of the contested constitutional question at issue to the
Supreme Court.
" As Stephen Wermiel has pointed out, senators have "learned to shape the constitutional
dialogue in confirmation hearings to make clear to nominees that a willingness to profess belief
in some threshold constitutional values is a prerequisite for thejob." Wermiel, supra note 78,
at 121-22. Neal Devins has attributed the pro-choice votes of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), at least in part to the impression left
on these Justices during their confirmation hearings that a willingness to accept privacy rights
(often a code word for abortion in the confirmation context) was necessary for their confir-
mations. See Devins, supra note 20, at 195.
.0 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 1, at 97-98, 114 (discussing the ease with which Justice
Ginsburg was confirmed despite refusing to answer many questions, as well as discussing
the correlation between nominees' and senators' ideologies).
102 There are several reasons senators may be reluctant to do this. For a full examination
of these reasons, see Devins, supra note 20, at 195-99.
103 See Stephenson, supra note 24; see also Devins, supra note 20.
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Such a delegation would be troubling, from a self-governance perspective, if it
was irreversible and permanent, or ifthe fact of delegation itself was contrary to public
wishes. But neither of these things seems likely to be the case. As we have seen, one
of the insights of recent empirical work examining the Court is that constitutional
law changes: it is neither irreversible nor permanent."° Consequently, if at some
point a public consensus is reached on the contested issue, adherence to that consensus
will become a condition of confirmation and the consensus will thereby be incorpo-
rated into our deeper constitutional understanding. 5 That this cannot occur until
the constitutional agreement is broad and deep-until the consensus is firm enough
that a majority of senators voting on enough nominees are willing to treat it as a con-
dition of confirmation106 is precisely how the confirmation process helps preserve
the essential distinction between constitutional and ordinary law.
As noted above, this delegation of decision-making authority away from elected
officials and to the Court could nonetheless be troubling if those being governed
objected to the fact of the delegation itself. This also, however, does not appear to be
the case. Senators are presumed to act in their own electoral self-interest. If a senator
believed that her constituents objected to this delegation of policy-making authority,
she could vote against a nonresponsive nominee on precisely those grounds. 7 More-
over, if voters become annoyed at their senator's refusal to do so-at the repeated
delegation of contested constitutional issues to the discretion of the Court without
an adequate understanding of how that discretion will be exercised-they can signal
their displeasure to their senator. If enough do so, the Senate presumably will respond
by more vigorously questioning nominees.
The point, in short, is that the public remains in charge: if a previously contested
(or unanticipated) issue becomes one that enough people come to view as implicating
core constitutional values, the issue will become a litmus test in future hearings. If
not, we can assume that the public is content to allow the Justices to continue to exer-
cise their discretion on the issue. More precisely, we can assume that the public's
"o4 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
1o5 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
'0 David Stras and Ryan Scott have calculated that it takes on average 16.2 years for the
Supreme Court to completely turn over its membership. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An
Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 791, 802 (2007).
0'7 Although it seems more likely that the public, like its elected officials, prefers to leave
difficult issues to judicial resolution. See William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in
the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagi-
nation, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular
Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 967 (2006) (arguing that judicial review has always been
supported by popular majorities because of its association with gradual and principled change);
see also Stephenson, supra note 24 (discussing why elected officials tolerate systems allowing
for the exercise of strong judicial review).
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level of contentment with the exercise of such discretion is no more troubling, from
a self-govemance perspective, than other delegation decisions made by the legislative
or executive branches. 08
b. Opportunity for Discussion
The other value that questions about currently contested constitutional issues
contribute to the process is the opportunity such questions provide for a high profile,
public discussion of controversial issues as constitutional issues. Barry Friedman
has extensively documented how constitutional law is advanced and changed through
an ongoing conversation between the courts, elected officials, and the public."° Con-
firmation hearings offer an ideal forum for this type of dialogue. By discussing com-
peting policy preferences in the language of precedent, principle, and institutional
competencies, confirmation hearings can encourage the public to think about how
their policy preferences intersect with and shape arguments about the meaning of the
Constitution itself.
Senators have long understood that confirmation hearings present an opportunity
for this type of discussion. Vice President (then Senator) Joseph Biden has favor-
ably compared confirmation hearings to "town meeting[s] on the meaning and im-
portance of the Constitution.""' Numerous scholars have documented the ways in
which senators involved in confirmation hearings use the high-profile process to
make "constitutional comments" expounding on their understanding of what the
Constitution means to them and the constituents they represent.' "' Senators also are
forthright about their use of the hearings to talk directly to the Court: senators posing
questions to the nominee appearing before them frequently stress their hope not just
that the nominee is listening, but that the sitting Justices are as well." 2
This discussion of policy disputes as constitutional conflicts, even when it leaves
the issues themselves unresolved, can help enable the public and its elected officials
to better evaluate which constitutional changes to accept or reject in the future. It can,
for example, put questions about flag burning in the context of a larger tradition of
tolerating disagreeable speech, or put concerns about Ten Commandments displays
108 Senators, who have to vote up or down on nominees who encompass a range ofbeliefs,
also at times have to compromise some constitutional issues in favor of others. This flaw, how-
ever, is shared by the elected branches, much of whose work goes undetected or uncorrected
by the electorate. Neither is considered fatal to the democratic credentials of those actors.
"o See Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 19, at 580-81.
10 Wermiel, supra note 78, at 122.
"' For an example and summary, see Frank Guliuzza III, Daniel J. Reagan & David M.
Barrett, The Senate Judiciary Committee and Supreme Court Nominees: Measuring the
Dynamics of Confirmation Criteria, 56 J. POL. 773, 782 (1994).
..2 See Nagel, supra note 3, at 873 (noting that senators often use the confirmation process
to "give advice" to sitting Justices).
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in a historical perspective. Putting policy disputes of this type into the language of
constitutional law is thus an additional benefit of this type of questioning.
The fact that existing questioning practices are adequate for the purposes set forth
here does not mean, of course, that the confirmation process could not be improved.
Senators armed with a principled defense of an ideological approach to confirmations
could, with confidence, push nominees to expound more precisely on their under-
standing of the meaning and scope of specific constitutional provisions, to answer
questions about how they would have voted in previously decided Supreme Court
cases and why,"3 and to discuss the types of facts and arguments they believe are
useful in constitutional decision-making. They also could ask nominees to demon-
strate how their preferred methods of interpretation would play out in actual cases,
and press nominees who disavow their earlier statements or writings on why (and
when) they changed their mind.
While this more rigorous questioning would be useful, it is important to note that
it is not essential to the idea advocated here. The confirmation process as conceived of
here does not envision using the confirmation process as a device by which to radi-
cally restrain judicial discretion by extracting commitments from nominees to adjudi-
cate cases in exact accordance with statements made at their confirmation hearings.
That type of precommitment is neither necessary nor appropriate." 4 Rather, the point
of an ideological confirmation process is to provide a democratically-credentialed
mechanism through which the Court's prior constitutional changes can be accepted or
rejected by the people acting through their representatives. While better questioning
could further that goal, it is not essential to it.
B. Potentially Problematic Underlying Assumptions
The above section illustrated how an ideological confirmation process can be seen
as both a normatively desirable and a theoretically useful response to the failure of
the conventional narrative. It argued that Supreme Court decisions implementing
under-determinate constitutional provisions can be thought of as akin to constitutional
propositions made by the Court to the country. Propositions that enjoy long-lasting,
"i' Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial
Confirmation Hearings, YALE L.J. POCKET PART, Jan. 2, 2006, available at http://www
.thepocketpart.org/2006/0 1/post and siegel.html; see also Ringhand, supra note 82, at 331-32.
14 Judging, even in the policy-laden world of the Supreme Court, requires attention to
details and arguments not presented in abstract or hypothetical scenarios. See, e.g., Post &
Siegel, supra note 113, at 47-48. Facts and circumstances change, and new arguments arise
even in old contexts. Id. A Justice therefore should not be asked to commit to future votes
without knowing what these changed facts, circumstances, and arguments will be. See also
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 97-101 (arguing for vigorous senatorial questioning but noting that
factual differences in cases as actually presented to the Court make it inappropriate for nomi-
nees to commit in advance to specific outcomes); Nagel, supra note 3, at 867.
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broad and deep support will become confirmation litmus tests, and nominees failing
to adhere to the public consensus on such issues will not be confirmed. Resolution of
constitutional questions raising issues on which there is not yet a stable political con-
sensus will be left to the discretion of the Court, subject to the right of the public to
reclaim the issue when such a consensus is reached, or when enough people are no
longer satisfied with judicial, rather than political, resolution of the issue. Over time,
this process will empower the public to control the evolution of constitutional law. Be-
cause this can only occur over the course of multiple confirmations, however, it also
ensures that the distinction between constitutional and ordinary law is maintained.
This story rests, however, on two potentially problematic assumptions. The first
assumption is that a nominee's ideological preferences are sufficiently constant to
make an examination of them at the time of confirmation meaningful. The second
is that Supreme Court vacancies are spaced in such a way that the preferences of the
elected officials charged with filling the vacancies accurately reflect the ongoing pref-
erences of the public-that vacancies are not, in other words, randomly skewed in a
way that favors one ideological perspective over the other. Each of these assumptions
is examined below.
1. Ideological Constancy
The concern here is that the use of ideology in the confirmation process cannot
successfully translate the constitutional preferences of the public into constitutional
law because the ideological preferences of Supreme Court Justices change over time,
thus undermining the usefulness of a democratic check imposed at the time of con-
firmation. The concern rests on work demonstrating that some Justices fail to vote in
accordance with the ideological preferences of the presidents who nominated them,
and that the ideological direction of most Justices' jurisprudence changes (or "drifts")
over time.'15
This concern is unwarranted. Most of the empirical work in this area has focused
on the relationship between presidents and nominees.'1 6 This focus ignores the role
played by the Senate in the appointments process. The Senate's role is key, however,
precisely because the preferences of the nominating President and the confirming
Senate will not always align. Not accounting for the ideological preferences of the
confirming Senate thus fails to fully capture the broader base of public sentiment
underlying the appointment. This in turn fails to fully appreciate the need for con-
stitutional changes to occur via the confirmation process only when support for them
is sufficiently long-lasting and deep.
Many of the examples of "disappointed" presidents cited in this literature can
be traced directly to a president's need to compromise with an ideologically hostile
" See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
220 (2007).
116 See, e.g., id.
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Senate." 7 The first President Bush's nomination of David Souter and President
Reagan's nomination of Anthony Kennedy are familiar examples of this. Both of
these Justices were nominated by Republican presidents and confirmed by Democratic
senates."' Their nominating presidents therefore needed to take senatorial prefer-
ences into account when making these nominations. This is particularly obvious in
regard to Justice Kennedy, who was selected by President Reagan only after the failed
nomination of Robert Bork and the withdrawn nomination of Douglas Ginsburg." 9
Even the most infamous example of presidential disappointment, President
Eisenhower's nomination of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan,
20
does not really support the premise asserted. Constrained by a Senate firmly in the
hands of the Democrats, Eisenhower, a Republican, elected to negotiate his nomina-
tion choices with the liberal northern wing of the Democratic party rather than its more
conservative southern wing.' 2' He therefore could not really have been surprised by
the subsequent liberal jurisprudence of his nominees, particularly on race-related
issues. 2 2 Indeed, far from casting doubt on the power of an ideological confirmation
process, stories like these are surprising only when we ignore the role of the Senate.
This need for compromise between a nominating President and a confirming
Senate does not harn the confirmations-based narrative developed here, but is essen-
tial to it. Preserving the distinction between constitutionalism and ordinary politics
requires that an interest group or political party be unable to stack the Court-and thus
unable to change constitutional law-unless the group or party enjoys broad public
support for an extended period of time. The need for a nominee to win approval
from both the President and the Senate facilitates this.
The concern about ideological constancy also, and relatedly, oversimplifies
the preferences it attributes to the nominating President and (by implication) the
confirming Senate. Presidents have on numerous occasions made Supreme Court
nominations for reasons other than concerns about constitutional development.' 23
President Reagan's nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, whose support for abortion
"' See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1068-69 (noting that presidents cannot appoint
"just anyone" to the Supreme Court and that Supreme Court Justices therefore, over time, "tend
to reflect the vector sum of political forces at the time of their confirmation").
18 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 11283-85,290-92 (5th
ed. 2008).
"9 See id. at 281-85.
120 Eisenhower is frequently quoted as saying that appointing Justices Warren and Brennan
were the two biggest mistakes of his presidency. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 115, at 220.
12 Seeid. at221.
122 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding antimiscegenation statute un-
constitutional); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding that racial segregation in
public transit violated the Interstate Commerce Act); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (holding that an electoral district that disenfranchised African-Americans violated the
Fifteenth Amendment).
123 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 115, at 87-91.
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rights disappointed many conservatives, was such an appointment. Justice O'Connor's
ambivalence about the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion was known both
to President Reagan and the Republican-controlled Senate that confirmed her. 24 The
issue simply was not as important to the coalition supporting her as was the political
benefit of fulfilling President Reagan's promise to put the first woman on the high
court. 125 While the confirmations approach advanced here would discourage this,
past confirmations fitting that pattern can hardly be characterized as failures of the
approach itself.
Concerns based on the phenomena of "ideological drift" are similarly oversimpli-
fied, at least in relation to their relevance to the ability of an ideological confirmation
process to shape constitutional law. Ideological drift occurs when the ideological
direction of a Justice's jurisprudence shifts over the course of his or her tenure on the
Court. 126 Recent work has illustrated that almost all of the Justices sitting on the last
Rehnquist Court underwent some ideological drift during the course of their careers. 27
124 At Justice O'Connor's confirmation hearing she was asked to explain her position on
abortion. She responded by saying that "[tihe subject of abortion is a valid one, in my view,
for legislative action subject to any constitutional restraints or limitations." The Nomination
of Sandra Day O'Connor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 61 (1981) [hereinafter O'Connor
Transcript] (statement of J. O'Connor). She went on to discuss in detail several votes involving
abortion which she cast while in the Arizona State Senate. These votes included a bill repeal-
ing Arizona's anti-abortion statutes, a vote in favor of a bill which appeared to allow family
planning services to provide abortions to minors without parental consent, a vote against a
message urging Congress to amend the Constitution to provide that the word "person" in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments included unborn children, and a vote against adding a rider
to a stadium construction bill that would have prohibited abortions in any facility under the
jurisdiction of the Arizona Board of Regents. See id. at 61-63.
125 See Lou CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OFALWETME 733 (2000) (discussing
Reagan's promise); Wermiel, supra note 78, at 129. Justice Souter's support for abortion rights,
which even more bitterly disappointed conservatives, was almost equally predictable. As
several scholars have noted, Justice Souter's vote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) the abortion case many conservatives believed the newly comprised court would
use to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), should not have been a surprise to anyone
who actually paid attention to Souter's testimony at his confirmation hearing. See Wermiel,
supra note 78, at 121, 135. Justice Souter's sparse record on the issue helped President H.W.
Bush avoid directly confronting an issue that was at the time controversial within his own party.
It also appears that President Bush was concerned about Republicans being held responsible
if the Court became too conservative and the country swung back to the ideological center.
See id.; see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth,
Ideological Values and the Votes of US. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812,
813-18 (1995) (finding that Justice Souter's votes in civil rights cases were highly correlated
with predicted votes on those issues derived from an ideological score based on news accounts
from the time of his confirmation).
26 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological
DrifiAmong Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1483, 1493-97 (2007).
'27 See id. at 1502-19.
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This work does not, however, show the issues on which the drift occurred, nor
does it show the impact, if any, that the drift of any individual Justice had on the deci-
sions of the Court as a whole. 128 Both of those facts are key to ascertaining whether
the ideological drift of individual Justices hinders the effectiveness of an ideological
approach to the confirmation process. The ability of the confirmation process to play
the role assigned to it here does not depend on individual Justices being labeled at
the time of their confirmation as either "liberal" or "conservative" and then voting
consistently with the ongoing substantive preferences of those ideological blocs.'
29
Nominees may well behave consistently with the expectations created at their confir-
mations (it would in fact be somewhat surprising if they did not) and still drift ideo-
logically. This could happen because the issue areas in which the "drift" occurs were
unanticipated or not prioritized during the Justice's confirmation process, or because
shifting political coalitions realigned the preferred policy package associated with
a particular political party.130
Neither of these types of drift is incompatible with the role assigned here to the
confirmation process. If new issues arise or new political alignments change the ideo-
logical expectations associated with a particular political party, then those changed
issues and expectations will themselves become litmus tests in future confirmation
hearings, ensuring that the Court as a whole-rather than any individual Justice-
remains attuned over time to the constitutional commitments of the people.13' The
fidelity of a given Justice to the changing political goals of the coalition that confirmed
him or her is not essential to that story.132
Research teasing out these more finely-tuned questions about presidential prefer-
ences and judicial performance supports this conclusion. This work, while not com-
prehensive, shows that presidents tend to get what they want on the issues they care
about, even if their nominees surprise them (or their reconfigured political coalition)
128 See David A. Strauss, Memo to the President (and His Opponents): Ideology Still
Counts, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 49, 49-50 (2007).
29 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1071-73.
130 The most obvious example of such a shift would be the realignment on racial issues
that occurred between the Republican and Democratic Parties in the early and mid 1900s.
The gradual polarization of the two parties' positions on abortion is another example. See id
at 1071 (noting that "parties are not ideological monoliths" and that "the ideological centers
of the major parties shift over time").
'3' Laurence Tribe, addressing several of the frequently recited examples of presidents
allegedly not getting what they want, makes exactly this point, arguing that in areas of par-
ticular concern to a given president, the president has usually gotten what he has wanted from
Justices he appointed. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 50. But see Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths:
Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986)
(reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985)) (rejecting
Tribe's conclusion).
132 There is nonetheless significant evidence indicating that judges do remain "faithful"
to those who appointment them. PERETTI, supra note 10, at 111-30.
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on other issues"' As David Strauss has pointed out, Justices Hugo Black and Felix
Frankfurter, both of whom were appointed by President Roosevelt, were and remained
solid New Deal supporters (the issue President Roosevelt was primarily concerned
about) despite their later split in civil rights cases (an issue that became important only
later to a realigned Democratic Party).34 President Nixon's "tough on crime" appoint-
ments remained tough even though they eventually disappointed conservatives by
voting in favor of abortion rights-an issue that had little political salience to Nixon
at the time of their nominations.135 The nominees of President Reagan, and those
of the first President Bush, have likewise shown stoutness on the state power and
federalism issues that formed the heart of the "Reagan Revolution.'
' 36
2. Timing of Vacancies
A more vexing problem is presented by the inconsistent timing of Supreme Court
vacancies. If the confirmation process is to function as a mechanism through which
the public can imprint its changing constitutional preferences onto the Court, then the
constitutional preferences of the elected officials controlling that process (the appoint-
ing President and confirming senators) must coincide with those of the public. The
votes of these elected officials, in other words, must reflect the preferences of the
public on whose behalf they are acting.
Our representative system of government assumes for purposes of ordinary
lawmaking that this is true, or at least true enough to justify treating duly enacted
'33 See id. at 84-88,228 (advocating for greater use of the confirmation process to impose
a politically controlled check on the Court and arguing that subsequent "value-voting" by
Justices creates a valuable form of political representation). Peretti also collects numerous
studies attempting to ascertain whether the confirmation process is an effective check. Peretti,
while expressing "strong reservations" about the ability of any of the studies to decisively
answer the question, concludes nonetheless that the Justices have more often performed in
accordance with expectations than not. However, Peretti's focus was on presidential, not sena-
torial, preferences. See id at 114-30; see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 75, at 495-97.
134 See Strauss, supra note 128, at 50-52; see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at
1073. But see KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE (2004) (arguing
that Roosevelt cared more about the racial politics of his judicial nominees than is generally
recognized). A different study done by Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth may also support
the conclusion that presidents get what they want on the issues they care about. In that study,
the authors found that ideological scores of Supreme Court Justices (derived from news cover-
age at the time of the Justice's confirmation) correlate with votes cast in economic and civil
liberties, but that the correlation is less robust for Roosevelt and Truman nominees. See Segal,
et al., supra note 125. This may indicate that when a nomination is focused predominately
on one issue-the New Deal for President Roosevelt, for example-the Justice's future votes
on lower profile or unanticipated issues may be less predictable.
135 See WHIrINGTON, supra note 115, at 226; see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 75,
at 496-97.
136 WHrrINGTON, supra note 115, at 275-81; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1070.
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legislation as legitimately binding law.' The confirmation process, however, pre-
sents a more complicated question. This is because Supreme Court vacancies occur
only infrequently, and at irregular intervals. 3 It is therefore possible that the spac-
ing of vacancies could give one side of a constitutional conflict appointment power
disproportionate to the public support enjoyed by that side. If this was to happen
repeatedly-either because of luck or because of strategic retirement decisions made
by the Justices 39-- then the Court would not, even over time, reflect the constitutional
preferences of the public.
Historically, there is little evidence that this has been a significant problem.
Supreme Court vacancies typically have occurred every two to three years. "4 President
Jimmy Carter was the first president to serve a full term and not get to make a nomi-
nation. 4' (Other presidents have had their nominees rejected and have been unable
to fill a seat while in office, but that is less worrisome from a confirmations-based
perspective). While a single vacancy usually will not-and should not-allow a
President to reverse the Court, regularly spaced vacancies will ensure that the Court
over time is responsive to long-lasting shifts in our constitutional understandings.
' There is a tremendous amount of literature discussing the ways in which our system
fails to accurately represent public opinion. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way
of Selecting Judges-Except All the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. Ky. L. REv. 267
(2005); Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: NationalPopular Vote andthe Electoral College,
7 ELECTION L.J. 196 (2008). Interest group capture, gerrymandering, the electoral college, and
the inability to easily rid ourselves of unpopular political actors are among the problems dis-
cussed in these works. Few ofthese scholars, however, argue that legislation enacted through
that imperfect system should be considered illegitimate or void because of these failings. The
democratic failures of our electoral system are thus treated as less significant than the demo-
cratic failures invoked by the "countermajoritarian difficulty" confronted by the Supreme
Court in the conventional narrative ofjudicial review.
'38 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1061-66 (discussing how the Court's involve-
ment in election law issues, including its decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), can per-
vert the ideological consequences of political confirmation hearings); see also Timothy M.
Hagle, Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme
Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25 (1993) (discussing political and personal factors that influence a
Justice's decision to retire); Stras & Scott, supra note 106 (discussing the duration of the
Justices' tenure on the Court and the desirability of imposing judicial term limits).
' There is an extensive debate in the literature regarding the extent to which strategic retire-
ments (Justices timing their retirement to best ensure that they are replaced by a like-minded
Justice) have increased and/or are successful. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 1, at
29-46; Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 769, 812 (2006); Hagle, supra note 138,
at 25-28; Gary King, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court: Adding Systematic
Explanation to ProbabilisticDescription, 15 AM. POL. Q. 373,373-86 (1987); see also supra
note 138.
'" See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 139, at 787-88.
14' David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, andthe Confirmation
Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1503-04 (1992).
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Recent history is potentially more troubling, however. Not a single vacancy
arose in the eleven years between Justice Blackmun's retirement in 1994 and Justice
O'Connor's in 2005.142 Moreover, of the nine Justices sitting on the Court today, all
but two (Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) were nominated by Republican presidents.143
This occurred despite the fact that Democrats occupied the White House for twelve
of the thirty years during which the vacancies filled by the current Justices arose.14
In other words, despite controlling the White House for approximately forty percent
of the relevant time period, Democratic presidents filled less than twenty-five percent
of Supreme Court vacancies arising within that time period.
Like the concerns about presidential surprise and ideological drift, however, this
concern about the timing of vacancies is weakened by reintroducing the Senate into
the story. Of the seven currently sitting Justices appointed by Republican presidents,
four faced confirmation by a Democratically-controlled Senate. 45 The constraint this
imposed on the nominating presidents is evident by the selections these presidents
made: the four currently sitting Justices confirmed in this situation were Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas.'"
Even a brief examination of the confirmations of each of these Justices illustrates
that it is no coincidence that two of them are reliable members of the Court's more lib-
eral bloc and that a third sits at its fulcrum point. 14 Justice Stevens was appointed
by President Ford in 1975.148 President Ford, obtaining office as he did through the
impeachment and resignation of Richard Nixon (and only one year away from his
own failed reelection bid) was in no position to force an ideologically conservative
nominee through the Senate, nor did he appear to have any desire to do SO. 14 9
The constraining influence of the Senate is even more self-evident in Justice
Kennedy's nomination. Justice Kennedy, as noted above, was nominated by President
142 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 139, at 770-71.
143 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 387.
144 See id.
145 See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf [hereinafter MEMBERS
OF THE SUPREME COURT]; U.S. Senate: Art & History Homepage, Party Division in the Senate,
1789-Present, www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one-itemandteasers/partydiv.htm.
146 See MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 145.
14 Justice Thomas's confirmation is perhaps somewhat of an anomaly in that the racial
politics underlying it may have led the Senate to accept a much more conservative candidate
than it otherwise would have. See COMISKEY, supra note 78, at 125-27; JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 216
(2002).
148 See MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 145.
149 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 330. Justice Stevens apparently was selected from
a list of nominees that included Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O'Connor, along with
Robert Bork, who apparently was rejected because of fears that the Senate, presented with
such a candidate, would simply refuse to confirm any nominee until after the 1976 election.
See id. at 328-30.
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Reagan only after the Democratic Senate made it perfectly clear, through its rejec-
tion of Robert Bork, that it would not confirm a candidate perceived as ideologically
extreme. 0 Kennedy's relative liberalism, far from being a surprise, was thus the very
reason he was confirmable at all. His comments at his hearing illustrate this. Among
other things, he affirmed his belief in a constitutionally protected right to privacy,"' he
endorsed a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 52 and he disavowed Judge
Bork's narrow originalism as a viable method of constitutional interpretation.'53 The
constraint imposed by the Senate in filling the Kennedy seat, far from being irrelevant
to the ideological direction of the Court, has made the difference between a Court on
which Justice Kennedy is the median Justice and one on which Justice Roberts or
Alito would likely be filling that role.
Justice Souter, likewise, was neither a failed "stealth" nominee nor much of a
surprise. He was selected by President George H.W. Bush in part because his views
on abortion-then a contentious issue within the Republican Party-were unclear.'"
Moreover, like Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter's liberalism on several issues was evi-
dent during his confirmation hearings. In response to senatorial questioning, Justice
Souter affirmed his support for Griswold v. Connecticut,"55 stated his belief that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes an unenumerated right
of privacy,"' agreed that the Equal Protection Clause covers more issue areas than
those intended by its authors,'57 indicated his support for affirmative action,' and
stated that constitutional protections should not be confined to the specific intent of
the framers but rather should change as the needs of society change."'
Plainly, while the opportunity to nominate Justices may be distributed in ways that
do not reliably reflect the changing constitutional preferences of the public, it is far
from clear that this disparity actually leads to ideologically skewed confirmations over
time. At least during the past thirty years, the Senate has exercised its confirmation
s0 See id. at 360-61.
... See Nomination of Anthony M Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
164-65(1987) [hereinafterKennedy Transcript] (statement ofJ. Kennedy). Stephen Wermiel
has noted that no one paying attention at the confirmation hearings of Justices Souter and
Kennedy should have been surprised by the pro-choice votes cast by those Justices in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. See Wermiel, supra note 78, at 121.
152 See Kennedy Transcript, supra note 151, at 151.
' See id, at 140.
114 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Bush's Move: Caution Wins, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A1;
see also Editorial, Chief Justice Souter?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at A22.
15' 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Nomination of David Souter to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st
Cong. 54 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Transcript] (statements of J. Souter).
156 See id.
' See id. at 129.
151 See id. at 182-83.
"' See id. at 303.
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power in ways that have successfully managed to counter the lack of proportionality
in presidential nominating opportunities. " While it is possible that the Senate's ability
to do this was merely fortuitous, it seems more likely that the split party rule enabling
it was itself a reflection of the deeply divided partisan affiliations of the public during
this same time period. 6'
Concerns about the lack of partisan proportionality in presidential nomination
opportunities also suffer from an additional flaw. Such concerns define each president
solely by his party ideology and then treat all presidents serving an equal length of time
as equally entitled to influence the direction of the Court. But as Keith Whittington
has observed in his work on regime politics, not all presidents are created equal, and
the differences between them have confirmation consequences.'62
Whittington has described presidents as either "reconstructive," "affiliated," or
",oppositional."'16 3 Reconstructive presidents, such as Presidents Jefferson, Roosevelt
and perhaps Reagan, come into office with a mandate to "reconstruct" government
in the face of a collapsing regime." Affiliated or oppositional presidents, presidents
like the first President Bush and President Clinton, have no such mandate. Rather,
they were elected to continue the agenda of the existing regime (H.W. Bush) or they
were elected despite the continuing popularity of an opposing regime (Clinton). 6
These presidents, particularly oppositional presidents, consequently must find ways
to accommodate and work within the dominant regime rather than claim a mandate
to reconstruct it. 166
Reconstructive presidents, not surprisingly, have more power to implement their
agendas (including their constitutional agendas) than do affiliated or oppositional
presidents. 67 Affiliated and oppositional presidents enjoy less impassioned public
support for their agendas and thus have less power to pursue them. 68 Under this more
nuanced view of the relationship between public opinion and the presidency, then,
it is neither surprising nor troubling if two-term President Reagan (assuming he was
160 See supra notes 145 & 146 and accompanying text.
161 For a discussion of political polarization during this era, see Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel
J. Abrams, Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 563 (2008).
162 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 115, at 22-25, 87-89.
163 Id. at 23-24.
'64 See id. at 23.
165 See generally id. (discussing the attitudes of each administration toward the Supreme
Court).
'66 See id. at 161.
167 See id. at 22-23.
161 See id. at 226-27 (describing President Clinton as an oppositional president). Watson
and Stookey made a similar point, arguing that a careful President in a non-vulnerable situation
should rarely be surprised by the subsequent jurisprudence of his nominees. GEORGE WATSON
& JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
66-68 (1995). Their observation seems well taken, given that most presidential disappoint-
ments seem to have occurred when the President was constrained.
20091
HeinOnline  -- 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 165 2009-2010
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a reconstructive president) had more ability to impose a conservative ideology on the
Court than did two-term President Clinton (an oppositional president) to impose a
liberal one.' 69 Rather than reflect an inappropriate lack of partisan proportionality,
this difference reflects a real difference in public support for the agendas pursued by
each president. Moreover, the likely result of these differences would be a Court com-
prised of both liberal and conservative Justices, but one on which the conservative
Justices are more conservative than the liberal Justices are liberal-a Court, in other
words, much like the one we have today. 7°
None of this is to claim that the unreliable distribution of Supreme Court vacancies
could not limit the ability of the confirmation process to play the role ascribed to it
here. Indeed, disruptions in the distribution of vacancies may well explain the few
eras in which the Court has gotten uncomfortably far out of alignment with public
opinion. Professors Calabresi and Lindgren, for example, attribute the "nine old
men" of the Lochner era to the fact that Presidents Taft and Harding made six and
four nominations, respectively, while President Wilson, who served longer than Taft
and Harding combined, made only three. 7 '
Repeated occurrences of this sort may ultimately lend support to suggestions that
we end the unreliable distribution of vacancies by imposing term limits on Supreme
Court Justices.'72 My point here is simply to argue that there does not yet appear to
be convincing evidence that variances in the opportunity to fill vacancies is inappro-
priately skewing the makeup of the Court today.
III. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN PAST CONFIRMATIONS
This paper has set forth a principled defense of an ideological approach to
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. It has not, however, called for radical change
in how those hearings are conducted. This is because ideology has long played a role
in our nomination and confirmation process, even when we have refused to acknowl-
edge it.' Issue-based disputes over Supreme Court nominations are neither new
169 Balkin and Levinson have made a similar point. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note
75, at 490.
'70 Public opinion polls support this conclusion: when asked in a 1992 survey if the Court
was too liberal, too conservative, or "about right," 58 percent of those polled chose "about
right." Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Se. 635, 642 (1992).
"' Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 139, at 811-12. For similar descriptions of the
extraordinary influence President Taft exercised in shaping the Supreme Court, see TRIBE,
supra note 2, at 129, and Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of
the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 510 (1998).
,72 For a discussion of these proposals, see generally Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note
139; Stras & Scott, supra note 106.
173 Watson and Stookey have said that the "conventional view" that Justices are selected
on the basis of their legal and judicial qualifications rather than their ideology is "one of the
splendid myths of American politics." WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 168, at 39.
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nor rare: presidents and senators have always known that who sits on the high court
matters, and they have always calibrated their behavior accordingly. 74
Our earliest and most revered presidents worked hard to ensure that the Court was
populated with Justices sympathetic to their political agendas. Presidents Washington,
Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln all attempted to "stack" the Court with political and
ideological allies.' 7 Lincoln refused to consider any appointee whose views on the
Union and slavery were not crystal clear (and in agreement with his).' 76 President
Grant packed the Court with Republican loyalists in order to ensure that an earlier
case invalidating the Legal Tender Act was overturned (which it promptly was). 1'7
President Adams nominated John Marshall as a bulwark against the anti-Federalist
agenda of President-elect Thomas Jefferson, 17 while Jefferson in turn refused to
appoint any nominee who had not demonstrated sufficient loyalty to his Democrat-
Republican agenda. 79 Theodore Roosevelt, much like his cousin Franklin decades
later, vowed to use his appointments to change a hostile and conservative Court into
one more aligned with his pro-government and anti-corporate agenda. 8'
The Senate has been equally aggressive in putting its institutional stamp on the
Court. The failed Bork nomination, far from being the seismic shift in senatorial
behavior that it has at times been portrayed as, was preceded by a long history of
vigorous senate opposition to judicial nominees.' Almost twenty percent of the
174 For a classic study of the role of politics in the Supreme Court confirmation process,
see ABRAHAM, supra note 118. See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 115, at 210-28 (describing
the appointments process as "brutal" until the late nineteenth century and detailing early fights
between presidents and the Senate). This almost certainly reflects what Brian Tamanaha has
recently argued: that there was no golden age of legal formalism in our historic experience.
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (St. John's Legal Studies
Research Paper, Working Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1123498.
17 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 67-70; PERE1rI, supra note 10, at 121; see also Paul
A. Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1146,
1148 (1988).
176 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 116-18.
' Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at
123-26 (discussing Grant's appointments to the Court).
178 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 82.
179 Id. at 85.
181 Id. at 157. Theodore Roosevelt wrote, "I should hold myself as guilty of an irreparable
wrong to the nation if I should put [on the Court] any man who was not absolutely sane and
sound on the great national policies for which we stand ..... " Id.
181 Empirical work indicates that the Bork hearing was not even much of an anomaly within
the context of the confirmation contests immediately bracketing it. See Guliuzza et al., supra
note 111, at 773-77 (finding that Bork was not asked a higher percentage of substantive consti-
tutional questions than were other Justices appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee
between 1955 and 1991).
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first 142 Supreme Court nominees named by presidents were not confirmed by the
Senate.1 2 In the nineteenth century that number was one in three.
83
The Senate rejected President Washington's elevation of Justice John Rutledge
to Chief Justice because of Rutledge's vocal objection to the then-recently negotiated
and politically controversial Jay Treaty. 84 Justice Stanley Matthews suffered through
months of senatorial resistance, stemming from his connections to finance and rail-
road interests, before winning confirmation by a single vote.'85 Pierce Butler's appoint-
ment was blocked by Senator "Fighting Bob" La Follette and the Progressives for
several bitter weeks.'86 Justice Charles Evan Hughes's nomination to Chief Justice
by President Hoover was fought viciously by the Senate because of Justice Hughes's
economic conservativism and connections to big business. 87 John J. Parker, another
182 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 39; see also Freund, supra note 175, at 1147; Strauss
& Sunstein, supra note 141, at 1501.
183 ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 38. Most of these rejections were for ideological or
political reasons, including partisan disagreements, concems that the nominee was insuf-
ficiently loyal to the agenda of his party, opposition by interest groups, or worries that the
nominee would too dramatically alter the jurisprudential makeup of the Court. See id. There
is a dispute among scholars regarding whether some of these rejections should be considered
"ideological" or "political." See John P. Frank, Are the Justices Quasi-Legislators Now?, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 921,922-23 (1990); see also Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and
Failed Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401,404-05 (2006). Since partisan
disagreements frequently reflect competing constitutional visions, it is not clear what the ulti-
mate significance of this distinction is. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 65, at 1062-66.
Further complicating matters, the Senate has frequently cloaked its ideological objections in the
language of ethics or character concerns, making it difficult in hindsight to determine if a
nominee was rejected for ideological or ethical reasons. See WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note
168, at 27-32 (discussing the impeachment of Chief Justice Chase and the Senate's filibuster
of President Johnson's failed elevation of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice); see
also ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 39-48 (1992) (discussing the Senate's rejection of early
Supreme Court nominees, usually for ideological reasons); PERETTI, supra note 10, at 89-90
(collecting research demonstrating the role of ideology and policy preferences in the con-
firmation process, and rejecting non-ideological partisanship as a significant factor in ex-
plaining senatorial votes); Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Comment on Danelski, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
925, 927 (1990) (reviewing scholarship on ideology and partisanship in the confirmation
process); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominees, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 927, 946 (1979); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note
141, at 1500.
'8 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 73; Whittington, supra note 183, at 428. President
Washington apparently did not dispute the propriety of the Senate's actions. See WATSON
& STOOKEY, supra note 168, at 13 (quoting President Washington as saying, "As the President
has a right to nominate without assigning his reasons, so has the Senate a right to dissent
without giving theirs.").
185 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 136-37.
186 See id. at 191-92.
187 See id, at 200-01, 205-06. President Hoover ultimately decided to accept the Senate's
own preferred nominee, Justice Benjamin Cardozo. See id.
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Hoover nominee, was rejected for similar reasons, and also because of concerns
raised by the NAACP.'88 The apogee of Senate resistance, however, may have been
its refusal to confirrnfive of President John Tyler's nominees.'89
These often epic confirmation battles have been comprehensively recounted else-
where.' 90 My recitation of some of them here is merely to illustrate that difficult,
political, and bitterly contested confirmation hearings are not a new development in
our country. In fact, the conditions under which they occur are highly predictable.
Empirical work has shown that Supreme Court nominations are most likely to be
contested when weak presidents (including presidents near the end of their terms)
nominate candidates perceived as ideologically hostile to the confirming Senate.' 9'
Confrontation under such circumstances is particularly likely when the nominee is
seen as underqualified or when the seat being filled is considered a particularly im-
portant or "swing" seat. 92 None of this is surprising, and none of it is likely to change
if the ideological underpinnings of the process are more openly acknowledged.
Indeed, if the confirmation process has changed in the last century it is not because
politics have suddenly intruded into a pristine and apolitical process, but because
democracy itself has changed it.' 93 The Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, for
the first time made senators directly accountable to their constituents." Suddenly,
188 See id at 42-43. Parker went on to be a distinguished defender of civil rights as a judge
on the Fourth Circuit. See id at 43. Parker's replacement was Justice Owen Roberts, the
Justice who "switched in time" and thus ended the Supreme Court's battles with President
Roosevelt over New Deal legislation. Id. at 202-04. This raises the provocative question of
whether replacement Justices such as Owen Roberts and Justice Kennedy, see supra note
119 and accompanying text, are particularly sensitive to the conditions under which they are
confirmed.
189 WHITTINGTON, supra note 115, at 211.
190 See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 118.
'9' See Ringhand, supra note 82, at 349-51 (discussing this empirical work).
192 See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 1, at 92-115; Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover
& Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model,
84 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 525 (1990) (modeling the number of senatorial "no" votes a Supreme
Court nominee is likely to receive based on the perceived qualifications of the nominee, the
strength of the nominating President, and the ideological distance between the nominee and
the confirming Senate); P. S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and
the Senate Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793 (1993) (discussing the relatively high failure
rate of "critical" or swing nominees who are perceived as likely to change the ideological bal-
ance on the reconfigured Court); see also JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES 4-5 (1995) (noting the high failure rate of Supreme Court appointments
made by unelected Presidents); WATSON& STOOKEY, supra note 168, at 51-56 (discussing
the effect of presidential strength and interbranch conflict on Supreme Court nominations).
'9' See Freund, supra note 175, at 1146; see also Griffin, supra note 54, at 2158-59.
'94 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the popular election of senators, rather than
election by state legislatures). For a discussion of the effect of the Seventeenth Amendment
on the confirmation process, see TRIBE, supra note 2, at 132-33. See also Gerhardt, supra
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what "We the People" want from our Constitution became highly relevant to senators
evaluating Supreme Court nominees. Backroom deals gave way to public examina-
tions of nominees, a transformation itself triggered in large part by the democratic
backlash created by the perception that an elitist, out of touch Senate confirmed their
former colleague Hugo Black without publically airing his Ku Klux Klan affiliation.'95
Consequently, what used to go on behind closed Senate doors now occurs in the
bright glare of daylight, accompanied by ubiquitous media coverage.'96 If this is a
bad thing-and I do not think it is-then the blame for it surely rests squarely on the
increasingly public nature of government decision-making, not on the loss of an
apolitical utopia in which senators set aside politics and their competing constitu-
tional visions and solemnly entered the Forum of Principle.
The idea that the public should play an active role in shaping constitutional
meaning is far from a radical concept in our history. As Larry Kramer has argued, the
people have long used both political and legal means to shape and change the meaning
of vague constitutional language. " A confirmations-based narrative both recognizes
this and provides a concrete and specific mechanism through which the public can
channel their efforts to affect it.
The approach envisioned here also offers additional benefits. First, an openly
ideological approach to the confirmation process will better inform the public about
the actual role of the Court in our governing scheme. In doing so, it may help move
our dialogue out of the "umpires" versus "activists" rut in which it is stuck. Em-
bracing the use of ideology also would eliminate the charade of senators packaging
their policy considerations as concerns about the "personal integrity" or character
of the nominees who appear before them. 9 ' It instead would encourage senators and
note 171, at 488-90 (1998); Whittington, supra note 183, at 434 ("It was only when the election
of senators was thrown open to regular citizens, rather than state legislatures, that the Senate
suddenly discovered the need to conduct its business in public.").
'9' WATSON& STOOKEY, supra note 168, at 142-45; Freund, supra note 175, at 1160. The
Senate Judiciary Committee reviewing Justice Thomas's nomination initially made a similar
decision (to vet Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations in a closed session) and suffered
a similar backlash. See COMISKEY, supra note 78, at 114; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 147,
at 198-99; see also Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Nancy Staudt & Rene Lindstadt, The Role
of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1145, 1151 (2005) (examining how control over confirmations has broadened from
a "'cozy triangle' of senators, the President, and the bar to include participation by interest
groups and the public (quoting Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbyingfor Justice:
The Rise of Organized Conflict in the Politics of Federal Judgeships, in CONTEMPLATING
COURTS 44-45 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995))).
'96 Among other things, televised hearings have increased constituency pressures on senators
facing confirmation votes. See WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 168, at 21.
'9' See KRAMER, supra note 20, at 24-25, 53-54.
'9' See William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme
Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 633, 665 (1987) (discussing the
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nominees to focus on what is at stake-the ratification of constitutional develop-
ment and change.' Senate confirmation hearings could be openly and frankly about
exactly what they should be about: a battle between competing visions of the best
meaning of the Constitution. Finally, an openly ideological confirmation process
holds at least the potential to increase judicial humility. A better understanding of
the Justices' roles as unique policy makers exercising discretion and judgment, rather
than mechanically applying preordained constitutional meaning, could reduce the
hubris of Justices who hide exercises of discretion and choice behind assertions that
"the Constitution made me do it." 200
CONCLUSION
This paper has offered a principled defense of the use of ideology in the Supreme
Court confirmation process. The approach developed here is grounded in a realistic
understanding of the Supreme Court's role in our governing process, and is theoreti-
cally useful to evolving constitutional narratives. It is useful to New Originalists in
that it offers a mechanism that can guide and legitimate constitutional construction.
It is useful to developmentalists in that it provides a specific and concrete device
through which the changing constitutional preferences of the public can be validated
as legal changes. Moreover, the reconceptualization offered here accomplishes these
things without necessitating radical or disruptive changes in our existing practice.
Consequently, this paper should advance the ongoing discussion of constitutional law
and the role of the Supreme Court in our governing process.
transparent falsity of this type of senatorial questioning). Robert Nagel has made a related
point, arguing that a de-legalization of the confirmation conversation could help democratize
the process by making it more accessible to the nonspecialist public. See Nagel, supra note
3, at 871-74.
' While this paper was written before the confirmation hearing of now Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, it is worth noting that the hearing was, by this metric, a step backward. Both the
senators and the nominee at the Sotomayor hearing repeatedly recited the formulaic notion
that the job of a Justice is simply to "follow the law." The questioning rarely raised the
complex issues presented by legal under-determinacy, nor did the nominee or the senators
spend much time discussing how Justices should decide cases when confronted with such
under-determinacy.
200 Judith Resnik has argued that individuals without "grand theor[ies]" ofthe Constitution
may make better judges. See Judith Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 889, 891 (1990).
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